We define a language CQP (Communicating Quantum Processes) for modelling systems which combine quantum and classical communication and computation. CQP combines the communication primitives of the pi-calculus with primitives for measurement and transformation of quantum state; in particular, quantum bits (qubits) can be transmitted from process to process along communication channels. CQP has a static type system which classifies channels, distinguishes between quantum and classical data, and controls the use of quantum state. We formally define the syntax, operational semantics and type system of CQP, prove that the semantics preserves typing, and prove that typing guarantees that each qubit is owned by a unique process within a system. We illustrate CQP by defining models of several quantum communication systems, and outline our plans for using CQP as the foundation for formal analysis and verification of combined quantum and classical systems.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum computing and quantum communication have attracted growing interest since their inception as research areas more than twenty years ago, and there has been a surge of activity among computer scientists during the last few years. While quantum computing offers the prospect of vast improvements in algorithmic efficiency for certain problems, quantum cryptography can provide communication systems which will be secure even in the presence of hysuch as BB84 typically contain classical communication and computation as well as quantum cryptography. We cannot simply make use of existing techniques for classical security analysis: for example, treating the security of quantum cryptography axiomatically would not permit analysis of the protocols which construct quantum cryptographic keys. Furthermore, the inherently probabilistic nature of quantum systems means that not all verification consists of checking absolute properties; we need a probabilistic modelling and analysis framework.
Any formal analysis which involves automated tools requires a modelling language with a precisely-defined semantics. The purpose of this paper is to define a language, CQP (Communicating Quantum Processes), which will serve as the foundation for the programme described above. CQP combines the communication primitives of the pi-calculus [15, 25] with primitives for transformation and measurement of quantum state. In particular, qubits (quantum bits, the basic elements of quantum data) can be transmitted along communication channels. In Section 3 we introduce CQP through a series of examples which cover a wide spectrum of quantum information processing scenarios: a quantum coinflipping game; a quantum communication protocol known as teleportation; and a quantum bit-commitment protocol. The latter will lead naturally to a model of the BB84 quantum key-distribution protocol in future work. In Section 4 we formalize the syntax of CQP and define an operational semantics which combines non-determinism (arising in the same way as in pi-calculus) with the probabilistic results of quantum measurements. In Section 5 we define a static type system which classifies data and communication channels, and crucially treats qubits as physical resources: if process P sends qubit q to process Q, then P must not access q subsequently, and this restriction can be enforced by static typechecking. In Section 6 we prove that the invariants of the type system are preserved by the operational semantics, guaranteeing in particular that at every point during execution of a system, every qubit is uniquely owned by a single parallel component. In Section 7 we outline our plans for further work, focusing on the use of both standard (nondeterministic) and probabilistic model-checking systems.
Related Work
There has been a great deal of interest in quantum programming languages, resulting in a number of proposals in different styles, for example [10, 18, 24, 26, 29] . Such languages can express arbitrary quantum state transformations and could be used to model quantum protocols in those terms. However, our view is that any model lacking an explicit treatment of communication is essentially incomplete for the analysis of protocols; certainly in the classical world, standard programming languages are not considered adequate frameworks in which to analyze or verify protocols. Nevertheless, Selinger's functional language QPL [26] in particular has influenced our choice of computational operators for CQP.
The closest work to our own, developed simultaneously but independently, is Jorrand and Lalire's QPAlg [9] , which also combines communication in process calculus style with transformation and measurement of quantum state. The most distinctive features of our work are the type system and associated proofs, the explicit formulation of an expression language which can easily be extended, and our emphasis on a methodology for formal verification.
The work of Abramsky and Coecke [2] is also relevant. They define a category-theoretic semantic foundation for quantum protocols, which supports reasoning about systems and exposes deep connections between quantum systems and programming language semantics, but they do not define a formal syntax in which to specify models. It will be interesting to investigate the relationship between CQP and the semantic structures which they propose.
PRELIMINARIES
We briefly introduce the aspects of quantum theory which are needed for the rest of the paper. For more detailed presentations we refer the reader to the books by Gruska [8] and Nielsen and Chuang [17] . Rieffel and Polak [22] give an account aimed at computer scientists.
A quantum bit or qubit is a physical system which has two basis states, conventionally written |0 and |1 , corresponding to one-bit classical values. These could be, for example, spin states of a particle or polarization states of a photon, but we do not consider physical details. According to quantum theory, a general state of a quantum system is a superposition or linear combination of basis states. Concretely, a qubit has state α|0 + β|1 , where α and β are complex numbers such that |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1; states which differ only by a (complex) scalar factor with modulus 1 are indistinguishable. States can be represented by column vectors:
Superpositions are illustrated by the quantum coin-flipping game which we discuss in Section 3.1. Formally, a quantum state is a unit vector in a Hilbert space, i.e. a complex vector space equipped with an inner product satisfying certain axioms. In this paper we will restrict attention to collections of qubits. The basis {|0 , |1 } is known as the standard basis. Other bases are sometimes of interest, especially the diagonal (or dual, or Hadamard ) basis consisting of the vectors |+ =
(|0 − |1 ). For example, with respect to the diagonal basis, |0 is in a superposition of basis states:
Evolution of a closed quantum system can be described by a unitary transformation. If the state of a qubit is represented by a column vector then a unitary transformation U can be represented by a complex-valued matrix (uij) such that U −1 = U * , where U * is the conjugate-transpose of U (i.e. element ij of U * isūji). U acts by matrix multiplication:
A unitary transformation can also be defined by its effect on basis states, which is extended linearly to the whole space.
For example, the Hadamard transformation is defined by
|1
which corresponds to the matrix
The Hadamard transformation creates superpositions:
We will also make use of the Pauli transformations, denoted by either I, σx, σy, σz or σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3:
I or σ0 σx or σ1 σy or σ2 σz or σ3
A key feature of quantum physics is the role of measurement. If a qubit is in the state α|0 + β|1 then measuring its value gives the result 0 with probability |α| 2 (leaving it in state |0 ) and the result 1 with probability |β| 2 (leaving it in state |1 ). Protocols sometimes specify measurement with respect to a different basis, such as the diagonal basis; this can be expressed as a unitary change of basis followed by a measurement with respect to the standard basis. Note that if a qubit is in state |+ then a measurement with respect to the standard basis gives result 0 (and state |0 ) with probability , and result 1 (and state |1 ) with probability . If a qubit is in state |0 then a measurement with respect to the diagonal basis gives result 1 0 (and state |+ ) with probability 1 2 , and result 1 (and state |− )) with probability , because of the representation of |0 in the diagonal basis noted above. If a classical bit is represented by a qubit using either the standard or diagonal basis, then a measurement with respect to the correct basis results in the original bit, but a measurement with respect to the other basis results in 0 or 1 with equal probability. This behaviour is used by the quantum bit-commitment protocol which we discuss in Section 3. 3 .
To go beyond single-qubit systems, we consider tensor products of spaces (in contrast to the cartesian products used in classical systems). If spaces U and V have bases {ui} and {vj} then U ⊗V has basis {ui ⊗vj}. In particular, a system consisting of n qubits has a 2 n -dimensional space whose standard basis is |00 . . (|00 + |11 ). The result is 0 (and resulting state |00 ) with probability , or 1 (and resulting state |11 ) with probability . In either case a subsequent measurement of the second qubit gives a definite (nonprobabilistic) result which is always the same as the result of the first measurement. This is true even if the entangled qubits are physically separated. Entanglement illustrates the key difference between the use of tensor product (in quantum systems) and cartesian product (in classical systems): an entangled state of two qubits is one which cannot be decomposed as a pair of single-qubit states. Entanglement is used in an essential way in the quantum teleportation protocol which we discuss in Section 3.2. That example uses the CNot transformation to create entanglement:
EXAMPLES OF MODELLING IN CQP

A Quantum Coin-Flipping Game
Our first example is based on a scenario used by Meyer [14] to initiate the study of quantum game theory. Players P and Q play the following game: P places a coin, head upwards, in a box, and then the players take turns (Q, then P , then Q) to optionally turn the coin over, without being able to see it. Finally the box is opened and Q wins if the coin is head upwards.
Clearly neither player has a winning strategy, but the situation changes if the coin is a quantum system, represented by a qubit (|0 for head upwards, |1 for tail upwards). Turning the coin over corresponds to the transformation σ1, and this is what P can do. But suppose that Q can apply H, which corresponds to transforming from head upwards (|0 ) to a superposition of head upwards and tail upwards (
(|0 + |1 )), and does this on both turns. Then we have two possible runs of the game, (a) and (b):
Figure 1: The quantum coin-flipping game in CQP and that the Hadamard transformation H is self-inverse:
Meyer considers game-theoretic issues relating to the expected outcome of repeated runs, but we just model a single run in CQP (Figure 1) . Most of the syntax of CQP is based on typed pi-calculus, using fairly common notation (for example, see Pierce and Sangiorgi's presentation [20] Q applies (x * = H) the Hadamard transformation to x; this syntax is based on Selinger's QPL [26] . This expression is converted into an action by {. . .}. Using a standard picalculus programming style, Q creates a channel t and sends (s![x, t]) it to P along with the qubit x. P will use t to send the qubit back, and Q receives it with t?[z : Qbit], binding it to the name z in the rest of the code. Finally Q applies H again, and continues with some behaviour C(z).
P contains two branches of behaviour, corresponding to the possibilities of applying (second branch) or not applying (first branch) the transformation σ1. Both branches terminate with the null process 0. The branches are placed in parallel 2 and the operational semantics means that only one of them interacts with Q. The other branch takes no further part in the execution of the system, because there is nothing for it to interact with; in Figure 2 (see below) we call it Garbage. Figure 2 shows the execution (combining some steps) of System according to the operational semantics which we will define formally in Section 4. Reduction takes place on configurations (σ; φ; P ) where σ is a list of qubits and their collective state, φ lists the channels which have been created, and P is a process term. Note that the state of the qubits must be a global property in order to be physically realistic. We record the channels globally in order to give the semantics a uniform style; this is different from the usual approach to pi-calculus semantics, but (modulo garbage collection) is equivalent to expanding the scope of every new before beginning execution.
The execution of System tracks the informal calculation which we worked through above. Our CQP model makes the manipulation of the qubit very explicit; there are other ways to express the behaviour (including putting everything into a single process with no communication), but the point is that we have a framework in which to discuss such issues. 
Quantum Teleportation
The quantum teleportation protocol [4] is a procedure for transmitting a quantum state via a non-quantum medium. This protocol is particularly important: not only is it a fundamental component of several more complex protocols, but it is likely to be a key enabling technology for the development of the quantum repeaters [6] which will be necessary in large-scale quantum communication networks. Figure 3 shows a simple model of the quantum teleportation protocol. Alice and Bob each possess one qubit (x for Alice, y for Bob) of an entangled pair whose state is
(|00 + |11 ). At this point we are assuming that appropriate qubits will be supplied to Alice and Bob as parameters of the system. Alice is also parameterized by a qubit z, whose state is to be teleported. She applies (z, x * =CNot) the conditional not transformation to z and x and then applies (z * = H) the Hadamard transformation to z, finally measuring z and x to yield a two-bit classical value which she sends This example introduces measurement, with a syntax similar to that of Selinger's QPL [26] . We treat measurement as an expression, executed for its value as well as its sideeffect on the quantum state. Because the result of a measurement is probabilistic, evaluation of a measure expression introduces a probability distribution over configurations: 0 i n pi • (σi; φi; Pi). The next step is a probabilistic transition to one of the configurations; no reduction takes place underneath a probability distribution. In general a configuration reduces non-deterministically to one of a collection of probability distributions over configurations (in some cases this is trivial, with only one distribution or only one configuration within a distribution). A non-trivial probability distribution makes a probabilistic transition to a single configuration; this step is omitted in the case of a trivial distribution. Figure 4 shows the complete execution of System in the particular case in which z, the qubit being teleported, has state |1 . The measurement produces a probability distribution over four configurations, but in all cases the final configuration (process Use(y)) has a state consisting of a single basis vector in which y = |1 . To verify the protocol 3 We can easily extend the expression language of CQP to allow explicit testing of r.
for an arbitrary qubit, we can repeat the calculation with initial state x, y, z = 4 (computer scientists might regard it as an entanglement server ). This process constructs the entangled pair (by using the Hadamard and controlled not transformations; note that our semantics (Section 4) specifies that the qubits x and y are each initialized to |0 ) and sends its components to Alice and Bob on the typed channels s, t : [Qbit]. Figure 5 shows the revised model.
Bit-Commitment
The bit-commitment problem is to design a protocol such that Alice chooses a one-bit value which Bob then attempts to guess. The key issue is that Alice must evaluate Bob's guess with respect to her original choice of bit, without changing her mind; she must be committed to her choice. Similarly, Bob must not find out Alice's choice before making his guess. Bit-commitment turns out to be an important primitive in cryptographic protocols. Classical bitcommitment schemes rely on assumptions on the computational complexity of certain functions; it is natural to ask whether quantum techniques can remove these assumptions.
We will discuss a quantum bit-commitment protocol due to Bennett and Brassard [3] which is closely related to the quantum key-distribution protocol proposed in the same paper and known as BB84. The following description of the protocol is based on Gruska's [8] presentation. Figure 6 shows our model of this protocol in CQP. The complexity of the definitions reflects the fact that we have elaborated much of the computation which is implicit in the original description. The definitions use the following features which are not present in our formalization of CQP, but can easily be added.
• The type constructor List and associated functions and constructors such as hd, tl, length, [ ], @.
• Product types ( * ) and functions such as fst, snd.
• if − then − else for expressions and processes.
• Recursive process definitions.
Alice is parameterized by x and xs; they could be explicitly chosen at random if desired. In AliceSend , the encoding of xs relies on the fact that (qbit q) initializes q to |0 . Bob uses m to record the results of his measurements, and n (received from Alice initially) as a recursion parameter. Bob receives random bits, for his choices of basis, from the server Random; he also guesses x randomly. The state BobVerify carries out the first part of step (4) above, but we have not included a check for non-correlation of the remaining bits. The states Verified and NotVerified stand for whatever action Bob takes after discovering whether or not Alice's statement in step (3) is true. All measurement in CQP is with respect to the standard basis. We express measurements with respect to other bases by first applying a unitary transformation corresponding to a change of basis. This can be seen in the else branch of BobReceive, where the code {if y = 1 then x * = H else unit} applies a change of basis if necessary.
Communication between Alice and Bob uses four separate channels, c, . . . , f. This proliferation of channels is a consequence of the fact that our type system associates a unique message type with each channel. Introducing session types [27] would allow a single channel to be used for the entire protocol, although it is worth noting that depending on the physical implementation of qubits, separation of classical and quantum channels might be the most accurate model.
We intend to use this CQP model as the basis for various kinds of formal analysis of the bit-commitment protocol; we make some specific suggestions in Section 7. We should point out, however, that this bit-commitment protocol is insecure in that it allows Alice to cheat: if each qubit which she sends to Bob is part of an entangled pair, then Bob's measurements transmit information back to Alice which she can use to change x after receiving Bob's guess. The real value of quantum bit-commitment is as a stepping-stone to the BB84 quantum key-distribution protocol, which has a very similar structure and is already being used in practical quantum communication systems. 
SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS
We now formally define the syntax and operational semantics of the core of CQP, excluding named process definitions and recursion, which can easily be added.
Syntax
The syntax of CQP is defined by the grammar in Figure 7 . Types T consist of data types such as Int and Unit (others can easily be added), the type Qbit of qubits, channel types [T1, . . . . , en * = e of unitary operators, and expressions involving data operators such as e + e (others can easily be added). Note that although the syntax refers to measurements and transformation of expressions e, the type system will require these expressions to refer to qubits. Processes P consist of the null (terminated) process 0, parallel compositions P |Q, inputs e?[ x : T ] . P (notation: x : T = x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn, declaring the types of all the input-bound variables), outputs e![ e] . P , actions {e} . P (typically e will be an application of a unitary operator), channel declarations (new x : T )P and qubit declarations (qbit x)P . In inputs and outputs, the expression e will be constrained by the type system to refer to a channel.
The grammar in Figure 8 defines the internal syntax of CQP, which is needed in order to define the operational semantics. Values are extended by two new forms: qubit names q, and channel names c. Evaluation contexts E[ ] (for expressions) and F [ ] (for processes) are used in the definition of the operational semantics, in the style of Wright and Felleisen [30] . The structure of E[ ] is used to define callby-value evaluation of expressions; the hole [ ] specifies the first part of the expression to be evaluated. The structure of F [ ] is used to define reductions of processes, specifying which expressions within a process must be evaluated.
Given a process P we define its free variables fv (P ), free qubit names fq(P ) and free channel names fc(P ) as usual; the binders (of x or x) are y?[ x : T ], (qbit x) and (new x : T ).
Operational Semantics
The operational semantics of CQP is defined by reductions (small-step evaluations of expressions, or inter-process communications) and probabilistic transitions. The general form of a reduction is t −→ i pi • ti where t and the ti are configurations consisting of expressions or processes with state information. The notation i pi • ti denotes a probability distribution over configurations, in which Σipi = 1; we may also write this distribution as p1 •t1 · · · pn •tn. If the probability distribution contains a single configuration (with probability 1) then we simply write t −→ t . Probability distributions reduce probabilistically to single configura-
−→ ti (with probability pi, the distribution i pi • ti reduces to ti). This separation of reductions and probabilistic transitions is necessary because of non-determinisim. A general state of a process may have a number of possible reductions, arising from communication or evaluation of expressions, as well as a possible measurement step with a probabilistic outcome. In order to meaningfully interpret the probabilities in such a state, we must decide whether to resolve the non-determinism or the probability first. We have chosen to resolve the non-determinism first; thus, one of the non-deterministic reductions is the measurement, resulting in a probability distribution over configurations. This means that our semantics is consistent with the PRISM probabilistic model-checker [12] , which we intend to use for verification. Cazorla et al. [5] discuss this issue further, and survey the approaches taken by several authors.
The semantics of expressions is defined by the reduction relations −→v and −→e (Figure 10 ), both on configurations of the form (σ; φ; e). If n qubits have been declared then σ has the form q0, . . . , qn−1 = |ψ where |ψ = α0|ψ0 + · · · + α2n−1|ψ2n−1 is an element of the 2 n -dimensional vector space with basis |ψ0 = |0 . . . 0 , . . . , |ψ2n−1 = |1 . . . 1 . The remaining part of the configuration, φ, is a list of channel names, which plays little part in the semantics but allows bookkeeping lemmas to be proved. Reductions −→v are basic steps of evaluation, defined by the rules R-Plus (and similar rules for any other data operators), R-Measure and R-Trans. Rule R-Perm allows qubits in the state to be permuted, compensating for the way that R-Measure and Reductions −→e extend execution to evaluation contexts E[ ], as defined by rule R-Context. Note that the probability distribution remains at the top level. Figure 11 defines the reduction relation −→ on configurations of the form (σ; φ; P ). Rule R-Expr lifts reductions of expressions to F [ ] contexts, again keeping probability distributions at the top level. Rule R-Com defines communication in the style of pi-calculus, making use of substitution, which is defined in the usual way (we assume that bound identifiers are renamed to avoid capture). Rule R-Act trivially removes actions; in general the reduction of the action expression to v will have involved side-effects such as measurement or transformation of quantum state. Rules R-New and R-Qbit create new channels and qubits, updating the state information in the configuration; qubits are initialized to |0 . Note that this treatment of channel creation is different from standard presentations of the pi-calculus; we treat both qubits and channels as elements of a global store. Rule R-Par allows reduction to take place in parallel contexts, again lifting the probability distribution to the top level, and rule R-Cong allows the use of a structural congruence relation as in the pi-calculus. Structural congruence is the smallest congruence relation (closed under the process constructions) containing α-equivalence (with respect to the binders defined in Section 4.1) and closed under the rules in Figure 9 .
TYPE SYSTEM
The typing rules defined in Figure 12 apply to the syntax defined in Figure 7 . Environments Γ are mappings from variables to types in the usual way. Typing judgements are of two kinds. Γ e : T means that expression e has type T in environment Γ. Γ P means that process P is well-typed in environment Γ. The rules for expressions are straightforward; note that in rule T-Trans, x1, . . . , xn must be distinct variables of type Qbit.
In rule T-Par the operation + on environments (Definition 1) is the key to ensuring that each qubit is controlled by a unique part of a system. The hypothesis that Γ1 + Γ2 must be defined means that it is not possible to type a system in which a qubit is shared by parallel components. This is very similar to the linear type system for the pi-calculus, defined by Kobayashi et al. [11] .
Definition 1 (Addition of Environments).
The partial operation of adding a typed variable to an environment, Γ + x : T , is defined by
This operation is extended inductively to a partial operation Γ + ∆ on environments.
Rule T-Out allows output of classical values and qubits to be combined, but the qubits must be distinct variables and they cannot be used by the continuation of the outputting process (note the hypothesis Γ P ). The remaining rules are straightforward.
According to the operational semantics, execution of qbit and new declarations introduces qubit names and channel names. In order to be able to use the type system to prove results about the behaviour of executing processes, we introduce the internal type system (Figure 13 ). This uses judgements Γ; Σ; Φ e : T and Γ; Σ; Φ P where Σ is a set of qubit names and Φ is a mapping from channel names to channel types. Most of the typing rules are straightforward extensions of the corresponding rules in Figure 12 . Because references to qubits may now be either variables or explicit qubit names, the rules represent them by general expressions e and impose conditions that e is either a variable or a qubit name. This is seen in rules IT-Trans and IT-Out. Rule IT-Par is similar to T-Par in enforcing non-sharing of qubits, and is generalized to cover qubit names as well as variables.
By standard techniques for linear type systems, the typing rules in Figure 12 can be converted into a typechecking algorithm for CQP models.
As an illustration of the linear control of qubits, consider the coin-flipping example (Figure 1) . In P , any non-trivial continuation replacing 0 would not be able to use the qubit y, which has been sent on t. In Q, after the qubit x has been sent on s, the continuation cannot use x. Of course, at run-time, the qubit variable z in t?[z : Qbit] is instantiated by x, but that is not a problem because P does not use x after sending it. In System, x is used as an actual parameter of Q and therefore could not also be used as an actual parameter of P (if P had a formal parameter of type Qbit).
SOUNDNESS OF THE TYPE SYSTEM
We prove a series of standard lemmas, following the approach of Wright and Felleisen [30] , leading to a proof that typing is preserved by execution of processes (Theorem 1). We then prove that in a typable process, each qubit is used by at most one of any parallel collection of sub-processes (Theorem 2); because of type preservation, this property holds at every step of the execution of a typable process. This reflects the physical reality of the protocols which we want to model. It is similar to the unique ownership theorem of Ennals et al. [7] .
We can also prove a standard runtime safety theorem, stating that a typable process generates no communication errors or incorrectly-applied operators, but we have not included it in the present paper.
First we work towards Lemma 4, which is type preservation for the reductions defined in Figure 10 . Lemmas 1 and 2 enable the step from Lemma 3 to Lemma 4 in a way that corresponds to rule R-Context in Figure 10 . In a similar way we now work towards Theorem 1. We need substitution lemmas (10 and 11) to deal with the reduction rules R-Com, R-New and R-Qbit (Figure 11 Proof. By induction on the derivation of (σ; φ; P ) −→ ipi • (σi; φi; Pi) , in each case examining the final steps in the derivation of Γ; Σ; Φ P . All of the results up to now have been proved for the internal type system ( Figure 13 ). Our intention is that at the top level, a system should be typechecked in the original (external) type system (Figure 12 ), so we need the following straightforward lemma to make the connection between the two systems.
Lemma 1 (Typability of Subterms in E).
If D is a typing derivation concluding Γ; Σ; Φ E[e] : T then
Lemma 13 (External/Internal Type System). Γ e : T ⇒ Γ; ∅; ∅ e : T and Γ P ⇒ Γ; ∅; ∅ P . Proof . Induction on the derivations.
FUTURE WORK
Our aim is to develop techniques for formal verification of systems modelled in CQP. In particular we are working towards an analysis of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, including both the core quantum steps and the classical authentication phase. Initially we will use modelchecking, in both standard (non-deterministic) and probabilistic forms. Standard model-checking is appropriate for absolute properties (for example, the quantum teleportation protocol (Section 3.2) claims that the final state of y is always the same as the initial state of z). In general, however, probabilistic model-checking is needed. For example, the bit-commitment protocol (Section 3.3) guarantees that, with some high probability which is dependent on the number of bits used by Alice, Bob's verification step is successful. We have obtained preliminary results [16, 19] with the CWB-NC [1] and PRISM [12] systems, working directly with the modelling language of each tool. The next step is to develop automated translations of CQP into these lower-level modelling languages; note that our operational semantics matches the semantic model used by PRISM.
Another area for future work is to develop a theory of equivalence for CQP processes, as a foundation for compositional techniques for reasoning about the behaviour of systems. We can also consider extending the language. It should be straightforward to add purely classical features such as functions and assignable variables. Extensions which combine quantum data with enhanced classical control structures require more care. Valiron's [28] recent formulation of a typed quantum lambda calculus seems very compatible with our approach, and should fit into CQP's expression language.
CONCLUSIONS
We have defined a language, CQP, for modelling systems which combine quantum and classical communication and computation. CQP has a formal operational semantics, and a static type system which guarantees that transmitting a qubit on a communication channel corresponds to a physical transfer of ownership. The syntax and semantics of CQP are based on a combination of the pi-calculus and an expression language which includes measurement and transformation of quantum state. The style of our definitions makes it easy to enrich the language. Our research programme is to use CQP as the basis for analysis and verification of quantum protocols, and we have outlined some possibilities for the use of both standard and probabilistic model-checking.
